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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Thomas K. Hooley appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a
new trial. Hooley argues that the district court should have treated his motion for a new
trial, filed in his criminal case, as a petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A jury convicted Thomas K. Hooley of aiding and abetting aggravated battery and
first-degree kidnapping. See State v. Hooley, No. 42627, 2015 WL 7758496, at *1 (Idaho
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2015). Hooley moved for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct.
Id. The district court denied Hooley’s motion. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial, id., and the Idaho Supreme Court denied Hooley’s petition for review (Aug.,
p.1). 1 The remittitur issued on December 18, 2015. (Aug., p.2.)
On May 7, 2018, Hooley filed a “Motion For New Trial Based on Evidence
withheld in violation of Brady with attached exhibits in support of motion.” (R., p.30
(spelling corrected).) He filed the motion in his criminal case, Case No. CR-2013-1732.
(Id.) Hooley sought “a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of an alleged Brady
violation.” (R., p.209.) The district court denied Hooley’s motion as untimely under Idaho
Criminal Rule 34. (R., pp.209-11.) Hooley timely appealed. (R., pp.212-18.)
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Hooley’s motion to augment the record is pending before this Court. (10/22/2018 Mot.
to Aug. the R. and Statement in Support Thereof.)
1

ISSUE
Hooley states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by failing to treat Mr. Hooley’s filing as a petition
for post-conviction relief based upon claimed Brady violations, and by
dismissing the petition without providing Mr. Hooley with notice of, and
twenty days to correct, defects in the petition?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Hooley failed to show that the district court erred by treating Hooley’s motion
for a new trial as a motion for new trial rather than as a petition for post-conviction relief
when Hooley filed his motion for a new trial in his criminal case?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Dismissed Hooley’s Motion For A New Trial As Untimely
A.

Introduction
The district court properly dismissed Hooley’s motion for a new trial as untimely.

Hooley does not dispute that a motion for a new trial filed at the time he filed his motion
for a new trial would be untimely. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) Instead, Hooley
argues on appeal that the district court should have treated his motion for a new trial, which
he filed in his criminal case, as a petition for post-conviction relief that commenced a
separate civil proceeding.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-10.)

His argument is squarely

foreclosed by Idaho Supreme Court precedent: “It would be too much of a stretch to hold
that a motion filed in a criminal case can be considered as a pleading commencing civil
litigation.” State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). Accordingly,
the district court did not err when it dismissed Hooley’s motion for a new trial as untimely.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State

v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008).
C.

Hooley Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Treated His Motion
For A New Trial As A Motion For A New Trial Instead Of A Petition For PostConviction Relief
The district court properly dismissed Hooley’s motion for a new trial based on

newly discovered evidence as untimely. “Any motion for a new trial grounded on newly
discovered evidence must be filed within two years after final judgment.” I.C.R. 34(b)(1).
For purposes of this rule, a judgment becomes “final” when the appeal or time for an appeal
has ended. See State v. Parrott, 138 Idaho 40, 42, 57 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2002). Here,
3

the district court entered the judgment of conviction on October 14, 2014 (R., p.26), and
the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court and then issued the remittitur in
Hooley’s appeal on December 18, 2015 (Aug., p.2). Hooley did not file his motion for a
new trial until May 7, 2018—two years and four months after the remittitur issued. (R.,
p.30.) Because Hooley filed his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
more than two years after his judgment became final, his motion was untimely. See I.C.R.
34(b)(1).
Hooley does not dispute that a motion for a new trial filed on May 7, 2018,
challenging a judgment that became final on December 18, 2015, is untimely. (See
generally Appellant’s brief.) Instead, Hooley argues on appeal that the district court should
have treated Hooley’s motion for a new trial, which he filed in his criminal case, as a
petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-10.) He relies on Dionne v.
State, 93 Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017 (1969), in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that
“[i]t is immaterial whether a petition or application is labeled Habeas Corpus or Post
Conviction proceeding” because “[s]ubstance not form governs.” Id. at 237, 459 P.2d at
1019.
The fatal flaw in Hooley’s argument, however, is that the Idaho Supreme Court has
already held that, regardless of substance, “a motion filed in a criminal case” cannot
commence a civil post-conviction proceeding. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79
P.3d 711, 714 (2003). In Jakoski, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
almost six years after the judgment was entered. Id. at 353, 79 P.3d at 712. After deciding
the district court did not have jurisdiction to address such a tardy motion, the court turned
to the issue of “whether [the defendant’s] motion to withdraw his guilty plea can be
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considered an application for post-conviction relief.” Id. at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. The court
recognized that it had held in Dionne “that an application for a writ of habeas corpus could
be considered as an application for post-conviction relief.” Id. The court explained that
holding made sense because “[b]oth habeas corpus and post-conviction relief . . . are civil
in nature.” Id. Recognizing, however, that habeas corpus and post-conviction proceedings
“are separate from criminal proceedings,” the court determined that “[i]t would be too
much of a stretch to hold that a motion filed in a criminal case can be considered as a
pleading commencing civil litigation.” Id. The court therefore refused to treat the motion
to withdraw as a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 355-56, 79 P.3d at 714-15.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has repeatedly applied Jakoski‘s bright-line rule to
reject defendants’ attempts on appeal to convert motions filed in criminal proceedings into
petitions for post-conviction relief. See State v. Allen, 153 Idaho 367, 370, 283 P.3d 114,
117 (Ct. App. 2012); Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190-91, 177 P.3d 400, 404-05 (Ct.
App. 2008); accord Woodley v. State, No. 38195, 2012 WL 9490101, at *6 (Idaho Ct. App.
March 2, 2012). In Allen, for example, the court refused to treat a motion filed in the
defendant’s criminal proceeding as a petition for post-conviction relief even though the
“motion was labeled ‘Amended Motion for Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty and Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief,’ and expressly requested relief under Idaho Code § 19-14901.”
Allen, 153 Idaho at 370, 283 P.3d at 117 (emphasis in original). “Despite these factual
distinctions,” the court found “Jakoski [was] on point in its holding that post-conviction
proceedings cannot be commenced by a motion filed in a criminal case.” Id.;
see ------Schwartz,
- --145 Idaho at 190-91, 177 P.3d at 404-05 (relying on Jakoski to hold that defendant’s letter
stating potential claims for post-conviction relief but sent to and filed with the judge in the
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criminal proceeding could not be treated as petition for post-conviction relief); Woodley,
2012 WL 9490101, at *6 (holding defendant’s argument that his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea should have been treated as petition for post-conviction relief “is foreclosed by
the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in [Jakoski]”).
Here, application of Jakoski‘s bright-line rule leads to the conclusion that the
district court should not—and indeed could not—have treated Hooley’s motion as a
petition for post-conviction relief. Hooley does not dispute that he filed his motion in his
criminal proceeding. (Appellant’s brief, p.2 (“Mr. Hooley wrote the case number assigned
to his underlying criminal case . . . .”).) That unavoidable concession dooms his argument
on appeal because “[i]t would be too much of a stretch to hold that a motion filed in a
criminal case can be considered as a pleading commencing civil litigation.” Jakoski, 139
Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714; see Allen, 153 Idaho at 370, 283 P.3d at 117.
Hooley does not even suggest that this Court should overrule Jakoski, and with
good reason. “Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless
that precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
overruling that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice.” State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4-5, 343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015).
Far from satisfying the criteria necessary to overrule a past decision, the logical
underpinnings of Jakoski remain sound. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Jakoski,
limiting the substance over form principle to habeas corpus and petitions for postconviction relief makes sense because “[b]oth habeas corpus and post-conviction relief . . .
are civil in nature and are separate from criminal proceedings.” 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d
at 714. Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court emphasized the close relationship between habeas
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corpus and post-conviction relief when it first announced the substance over form
principle: “This court . . . construes the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act as an
expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . .” Dionne, 93 Idaho at 237, 459 P.2d at 1019.
“In contrast, a post-conviction action is entirely distinct from, and serves a different
purpose than, the criminal case.” Allen, 153 Idaho at 370, 283 P.3d at 117; see Charboneau
v. State, 162 Idaho 160, 170, 395 P.3d 379, 389 (2017) (“‘An application for postconviction relief is a special proceeding, civil in nature, distinct from the criminal
proceeding which led to the conviction.’” (quoting State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233,
766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988))). Given the similarity between habeas corpus and postconviction proceedings and the distinct nature of criminal proceedings compared to postconviction proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court correctly held in Jakoski that substance
over form governs when deciding whether a civil post-conviction filing should be treated
as a petition for post-conviction relief or a habeas corpus petition but that “[i]t would be
too much of a stretch to hold that a motion filed in a criminal case can be considered as a
pleading commencing civil litigation.” Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714.
Rather than ask this Court to overrule Jakoski, Hooley alleges a number of
distinctions between his case and Jakoski that make no difference in light of Jakoski’s
bright-line rule. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-10.) All of Hooley’s alleged distinctions suggest
that his motion for a new trial is more like a petition for post-conviction relief than was the
motion to withdraw filed in Jakoski. (Id.) But that is irrelevant in light of Jakoski’s brightline rule. In Jakoski, the Idaho Supreme Court did not refuse to consider the motion to
withdraw as a petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it did not closely enough
resemble a petition for post-conviction relief. See Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at
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714. The court refused to treat the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief simply
because it was “a motion filed in a criminal case.” Id.; see Allen, 153 Idaho at 370, 283
P.3d at 117 (finding Jakoski precluded the court from treating a motion partially labeled as
a motion for post-conviction relief that expressly invoked the statute for post-conviction
relief as a petition for post-conviction relief because the motion was filed in a criminal
proceeding). In short, none of Hooley’s alleged distinctions change the facts that Hooley
filed a motion in his criminal case and now asks this Court to treat his motion as a petition
for post-conviction relief on appeal. Based on those undisputed (and indisputable) facts,
Jakoski forecloses Hooley’s argument. See Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714;
Allen, 153 Idaho at 370, 283 P.3d at 117.
In addition to Hooley’s alleged distinctions being irrelevant under Jakoski, the state
disagrees with the alleged distinctions and a number of assertions Hooley makes in trying
to prove the distinctions. For example, Hooley suggests that his motion should not have
been treated as a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence because “he
did not argue he met the test applied to such motions as described in State v. Drapeau, 97
Idaho 685 (1976).” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) That makes no sense. Hooley claims the new
evidence proves a Brady 2 violation, and a motion for a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence that relies on Brady is governed by the rules of Brady, not Drapeau.
See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 502-03, 399 P.3d 804, 829-30 (2017) (addressing
Brady claims raised in the context of a motion of a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence); see State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 422, 313 P.3d 732, 750 (Ct. App. 2013)
(holding district court erred when it applied Drapeau standard rather than Brady standard
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Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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to motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence that relied on Brady). Hooley
relied on the Brady rules in his motion for a new trial, which are precisely the rules one
would expect Hooley to rely upon in a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence that alleges a Brady violation. See Lankford, 162 Idaho at 502-03, 399 P.3d at
829-30; see Branigh, 155 Idaho at 422, 313 P.3d at 750.
As another example, Hooley tries to distinguish Jakoski by inferring that the
defendant in Jakoski “understood the difference between a petition for post-conviction
relief and a motion to withdraw his guilty plea” because he “had previously filed a petition
for post-conviction relief.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) As the need for Hooley to infer that
fact suggests, the Idaho Supreme Court made no mention of the defendant’s understanding
of the difference between his motion and a petition for post-conviction relief when it
refused to treat his motion as a petition for post-conviction relief. See Jakoski, 139 Idaho
at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Furthermore, Hooley’s unsupported theory creates no distinction
at all: Hooley fails to mention that he previously filed a motion for a new trial in this same
criminal case. See Hooley, 2015 WL 7758496, at *1. If the defendant in Jakoski knew the
difference between a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea because he had filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the past, as Hooley
suggests, then Hooley knew the difference between a motion for a new trial and a petition
for post-conviction relief because he had filed a motion for a new trial in the past. 3

3

Hooley also emphasizes that he filed his motion pro se. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)
Whatever leniency that affords him, but see PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho 33, ___,
423 P.3d 454, 459 (2018) (“Pro se litigants are not entitled to special consideration or
leniency because they represent themselves.”), it does not distinguish his case from
Jakoski. As the Idaho Court of Appeals observed in Jakoski, before the Idaho Supreme
Court granted review, “Jakoski filed a pro se Rule 33 motion to withdraw his plea.” State
v. Jakoski, No. 27368, 2002 WL 31855374, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2002).
9

Regardless of the merits of any of Hooley’s alleged distinctions, the bottom line is
that Hooley is asking this Court to treat a motion filed in his criminal case as a pleading
commencing civil litigation. The Idaho Supreme Court has already held that is “too much
of a stretch.” See Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Thus, the district court acted
properly when it treated Hooley’s motion for a new trial as a motion for a new trial and
dismissed it as untimely.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Hooley’s motion for a new trial.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of December, 2018, served a true
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JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd

10

